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Abstract. A growing body of research in political science has uncovered evidence of a “split
personality” among Americans when it comes to racial attitudes, whereby people express different
attitudes in public than they personally hold. A common assumption is that people adjust their
personal attitudes to conform to dominant social norms. At present, however, there is no theoretical
model that could account for the emergence of racial norms that are at odds with people’s personal
attitudes. This paper proposes a simple neural model of racial attitude formation that makes an
important distinction between socially shared and idiosyncratic racial attitudes. Socially shared
attitudes reflect evaluations that are culturally transmitted and may not necessarily represent an
individual’s personal views. In contrast, idiosyncratic attitudes represent a sense of interpersonal
‘chemistry’ that may be at odds with dominant social norms. A computational model based on
Kimura’s (1983) Neutral Theory of Evolution predicts that socially shared racist attitudes may be
able to coexist with, and eventually be replaced by, more favorable idiosyncratic racial attitudes.
In order to investigate racial attitudes unencumbered by considerations of social desirability and
‘political correctness,’ this study augments traditional survey measures with a number of reaction
time based measures of non-conscious racial attitudes. Socially shared, non-conscious attitudes are
measured using implicit racial priming based on a lexical decision task. Idiosyncratic
non-conscious attitudes are measured using a timed trait rating procedure to measure feelings of
implicit closeness towards African Americans and White Americans.
Experimental results (N=555) support the predictions derived from the computational model. They
suggest that socially shared racial attitudes (as measured by implicit priming) are biased in a
pro-White and anti-Black direction, even among non-White participants. This bias is interpreted as
a subconscious remnant of old racist norms. On the idiosyncratic level, however, an entirely
different picture emerges. Attitudes that are measured by the timed trait rating procedure are much
more favorable toward African Americans. A multivariate analysis suggests that implicit closeness
to Blacks drives support for race related policies such as affirmative action. Thus, idiosyncratic
racial attitudes may be able to overcome the lingering effect of socially shared racist attitudes. The
implications of the theoretical model and the empirical findings of this study are discussed and
future research projects are proposed.

1. Introduction
A growing body of research in political science and social psychology has uncovered evidence of
a “split personality” among Americans when it comes to racial attitudes (e.g., Devine 1989,
Terkildsen 1993, Fazio et al. 1995, Greenwald et al. 1995, Kuklinski et al. 1997, Berinsky 2004,
Feldman & Huddy 2005). People appear to voice different attitudes in public than privately when
given the opportunity to express their personal views anonymously (e.g., Kuklinski et al. 1997).
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This discrepancy is often interpreted as a social desirability effect among White1 Americans who
engage in self-monitoring. According to this interpretation, self-monitoring White respondents
may adjust their old-fashioned, unfavorable views of African Americans to a new, pro-black
norm of ‘political correctness’. In order to control for this social desirability effect, some
researchers use Snyder and Gangestad’s (1986) self-monitoring scale (e.g., Terkildsen 1993,
Berinsky 2004, Feldman & Huddy 2005). Other researchers attempt to measure unfavorable
attitudes directly outside the respondents’ awareness using reaction time measures (Devine 1989,
Fazio et al. 1995, Greenwald et al. 1995). They generally find a powerful pro-White and antiBlack bias among their White respondents on the non-conscious (implicit) level even among
respondents who express favorable views on the conscious (explicit) level. Reviewing a large
volume of evidence from the Implicit Association Test (IAT) in different domains of explicit and
implicit attitudes, ranging from race and ethnicity to gender and age stereotypes, Greenwald et al.
(2002) detect a general “empirical dissociation between the two types of measures” (Greenwald
et al. 2002, p. 18). Social desirability explanations of this dissociation seem to imply that explicit
attitudes are more susceptible to social norms than implicit ones. This may lead to the
interpretation that implicit attitudes more faithfully represent an individual’s ‘personal’ attitudes.
A radically different interpretation is implied by the model of dual attitudes proposed by Wilson
et al. (2000). According to this model, implicit and explicit attitude-measures tap different
aspects of an individual’s attitudes both of which may be influenced by personal feelings or social
norms. The main difference is that implicit attitudes tend to reflect attitudes that have been
rehearsed for a longer period of time and have become automatic. Such automatic responses
require no conscious thought while newer attitudes require conscious effort. According to their

1

In order to emphasize the socially constructed character of the race concept names of racial and ethnic groups are
capitalized in this paper even if they refer to colors (e.g., Black, White, Black Americans, and White Americans).
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interpretation, explicit attitudes may be just as ‘genuine’ as implicit ones, and they compare the
rehearsal process to motor skills such as playing the piano or playing tennis. The conscious
attempt to rehearse a new musical piece or a new serve cannot be interpreted as a disingenuous
attempt at yielding to social norms, but as a genuine desire to play well. Similarly, favorable
attitudes towards African Americans on the explicit level may represent a genuine desire at
adopting a positive attitude, rather than a superficial attempt to satisfy social norms.
Whether social norms lead individuals to publicly misstate their personally held attitudes,
or whether they infuse individuals with a genuine desire to adopt and rehearse new attitudes,
neither interpretation offers a scenario that could explain how these social norms may emerge.
This paper provides a simple theoretical model of racial norms evolution that is based on a few
simple assumptions about neural organization and social communication. This model will be
explained in the following section. A number of hypotheses are derived from the model and
empirically tested based on a sample of N=555 college students in section 3. Finally, section 4
presents simulation results based on a computational version of the racial norms evolution model
and compares the patterns observed in the simulations to the patterns observed in the student
experiment.

2. A Simple Model of Racial Norms Evolution
The model of racial norms evolution proposed in this paper combines intra-personal properties of
neural brain organization with inter-personal properties of social communication processes. On
the intra-personal level, it assumes that sensory perceptions of internal body states and sensory
perceptions of external stimuli are processed in different brain regions (see section 2.1). The
model further assumes that both types of sensory perception, internal as well as external, are
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subjected to a process of Hebbian learning (Donald O. Hebb 1949), whereby repeated rehearsal
leads to automaticity. This process is equivalent to the rehearsal process described in Wilson’s et
al. (2000) dual attitude model and its neural basis will be described in greater detail in section 2.2.
Finally, on the inter-personal level, the model of racial norms evolution is inspired by Motoo
Kimura’s (1983) theory of neutral evolution. This principle predicts the emergence of dominant
norms by random drift even in the absence of selective advantages. This aspect of the model will
be described in section 2.3.

2.1 Idiosyncratic and Socially Shared Attitudes
The idiosyncratic vs. socially shared distinction is based on the assumption that sensory
perceptions of internal body states (internal stimuli) are processed in different brain regions than
sensory perceptions of environmental events (external stimuli). While the latter can be observed
by a number of individuals at the same time, the latter is perceived only by the individual him or
herself. When people communicate it is easier to reach agreement about external stimuli than
about internal ones. In addition, communications by others (whether in verbal form, in body
language, or other symbols) enter the individual’s brain as external stimuli and are assumed to be
easier to communicate to others, since they are already stored in a communicable format. In
contrast, internal body states enter the brain as diffuse sensations that are more difficult to express
to others. Due to high levels of interconnectivity within the brain, these two regions are not
assumed to be isolated, but rather to be interconnected in a peculiar form: Idiosyncratic
perceptions of internal body states can be expressed in a communicable format with probability
p(idiosyncratic). This probability depends on the level of difficulty translating internal body
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sensations into a communicable format2. It may be easier, for example, to express the internal
body state of ‘feeling hungry’ than the complex sensation of feeling a ‘sense of chemistry’ with a
complete stranger.

No anatomical accuracy implied:

External:
Socially Shared
Stimuli (s)

s
i

Internal:
Idiosyncratic Stimuli
(i), “Chemistry”

Figure 1: Distinction between Idiosyncratic (i) vs.
Socially Shared Attitudes (s). The white arrow
indicates the probability that an idiosyncratic
attitude will be translated into an externally
communicable format, p(idiosyncratic).

It is important to note that the expression of idiosyncratically perceived internal body states is a
one way street. External perceptions of environmental stimuli, including communications from
others, are assumed to be unable to influence internal body states. This is not an arbitrary
assumption, but is rooted in the consideration that internal body states are likely to be the
exclusive domain of an individual and cannot be directly determined by external stimuli. The
same external stimulus may elicit very different body reactions in two different individuals. For
2

Section 4 provides simulation results based on the model of racial norms evolution in which p(idiosyncratic) takes
on various values.
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example, a seafood connoisseur and an individual that is allergic to seafood may be able to talk
about “seafood” based on a socially shared understanding of language, however, it will be
associated with pleasant internal body states in the connoisseur, and with highly unpleasant ones
in the allergic individual. No amount of emphasis on the part of the connoisseur of how delicious
seafood is will be able to eliminate the unpleasant body state in the allergic individual. Figure 1
represents the spatial distinction between idiosyncratic attitudes (i) based on the perception of
internal body states and socially shared attitudes (s) based on external stimulation. It is important
to note that no anatomical accuracy is implied; the spatial separation, not the exact location, is of
importance for the model proposed here.

2.2 Implicit and Explicit Attitudes
In line with Wilson’s et al. (2000) dual attitude model, the model of racial norms evolution
assumes that frequently repeated (well rehearsed) thoughts, feelings, or motor functions are
processed significantly faster than not so frequently repeated ones. This rehearsal effect is based
on the principle of Hebbian learning (Hebb 1949). Donald O. Hebb (1949) formulated this
principle based on the observation that the synaptic gap between two connected neurons tends to
grow narrower with repeated simultaneous activation of the two neurons. The narrower the gap,
the faster the signal transmission between the two neurons. Thus, frequently repeated thoughts,
feelings, or motor functions are executed significantly faster than ‘new’ thoughts, feelings, or
motor functions. The principle of Hebbian learning leads to associative learning in artificial
neural nets and may provide a neural basis to Wilson’s et al. (2000) dual attitudes model as well
as to the implicit-explicit attitude distinction made in the racial norms evolution model proposed
here. The principle of Hebbian learning suggests that both types of racial attitudes discussed in
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section 2.1 – idiosyncratic as well as socially shared – should become automatic after frequent
activation (rehearsal). Thus, both types of racial attitudes should be detectable on the unconscious
(implicit) level outside of an individual’s conscious control.

This leads to a two-by-two

classification scheme of racial attitudes distinguishing (1) implicit idiosyncratic attitudes, (2)
implicit socially shared attitudes, (3) explicit idiosyncratic attitudes, and (4) explicit socially
shared attitudes. Possible measurement methods for these four types of racial attitudes are
discussed in section 3.

2.3 Random Norms Evolution
In addition to the two intra-personal processes described in sections 2.1 and 2.2, the model of
racial norms evolution contains an inter-personal element that links various individual neural
networks in a social network. Within this network, neighbors communicate with one another and
exchange their socially shared attitudes (denoted s in figure 1). The fact that they exchange
socially shared attitudes rather than idiosyncratic ones is based on the fact that these attitudes are
already stored in a ‘communicable’ format while idiosyncratic attitudes require translation into
such a format (see section 2.1). When two neighbors communicate, one neighbor is randomly
designated as ‘persuader’ and the other as ‘persuadee.’ The persuadee is assumed to adopt the
socially shared attitude of the persuader. Since each individual has exactly the same probability
of being designated ‘persuader’ or ‘persuadee,’ no selection mechanism for a particular attitude is
built into the model that could explain why a given attitude becomes socially dominant.
Nonetheless, a process invariably occurs by which one out of any number of equal alternatives
eventually emerges as a socially dominant majority attitude. This process, referred to in
biological theory as ‘random drift,’ has been mathematically analyzed by Motoo Kimura (1983)
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in his theory of neutral evolution.
Since this evolutionary model is new to the social sciences, a brief description of its
biological origin is in place.

It was developed by Kimura (1983) to explain evolutionary

phenomena that cannot be explained by the Darwinian principle of natural selection. It became
necessary when molecular genetics in the late 1960s, to their own surprise, encountered unequal
distributions of selectively neutral synonymous alleles. Synonymous alleles are different
DNA-sequences, that code for the same protein. Since an organism’s selective advantage relies
on the proteins it is composed of, these synonymous DNA-sequences are indistinguishable from
one another by natural selection. This puzzle was solved by the strange dynamic of the Neutral
Theory of Evolution that demonstrates how a purely random process will inevitably lead to
distinct patterns in which one neutral alternative will dominate and eventually replace other equal
alternatives.

Kimura (1983) states: “The neutral theory asserts that the great majority of

evolutionary changes at the molecular level ... are caused not by Darwinian selection but by
random drift of selectively neutral ... mutagens” (Kimura 1983, S. xi). By virtue of the fact that
Kimura’s theory emphasizes the formative power of random mutational processes, it has become
the dominant theory of evolution on the molecular level. Interestingly, the use of random
evolution models in political science precedes Kimura’s neutral theory. In 1968 William N.
McPhee (1968) proposed a “Campaign Simulator” (p. 169) based on similar ideas and his
colleagues Jack Ferguson and Robert B. Smith applied a related model to voting behavior. Due to
the popularity of Darwinian models in social science applications, however, the power of
Kimura’s (1983) neutral evolution remains largely unexplored in contemporary political science.
The main advantage of Kimura’s (1983) random evolution model is its maximal parsimony which
makes it attractive as a null model against which more restrictive theories could potentially be
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tested.
When all three elements of the racial norms evolution model are taken together – the
distinction between idiosyncratic vs. socially shared attitudes described in section 2.1, the
distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes described in section 2.2 (see also Wilson et al.
2000), and the phenomenon of ‘random drift’ based on Kimura’s (1983) Theory of Neutral
Evolution – a number of predictions can be derived. First, due to the dynamic of Kimura’s (1983)
Neutral Theory Evolution, we should observe a single attitude to become a dominant social norm
even in otherwise random communication processes. Based on the idea that socially shared and
idiosyncratic attitudes may be processed in different brain regions (see section 2.1), the
expectation naturally follows that over time idiosyncratic attitudes and socially shared ones
should diverge for most individuals on topics that are widely discussed in the population.
Further, attitudes (whether idiosyncratic or socially shared) that have been held by the individual
for a longer period of time should tend to become automatic due to the process of Hebbian
attitude rehearsal described in section 2.2 (compare also Wilson et al. 2000). Section 3 will
discuss possible measures of implicit idiosyncratic and implicit socially shared attitudes, and it
will present empirical findings based on a college student study (N=555). Section 4 will compare
the patterns observed in the student study to simulation results based on a computational version
of the Racial Norms Evolution model described in this section.

3. Empirical Measures and Empirical Results (N=555)
The difference between the four types of racial attitudes distinguished in section 2 may be
illustrated by the historical example of Senator Strom Thurmond. His example suggests widely
varying attitudes on the implicit and explicit idiosyncratic levels on one hand, and the implicit
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and explicit socially shared ones on the other. In a Dallas radio address in September 1948,
Thurmond voiced his opposition to integration, bluntly warning that integrationists “will find …
that in the lunchrooms, restrooms, recreation rooms, they will be compelled by law to mingle
with persons and races which all their lives they have, by free choice, avoided in social and
business intercourse” (cited in Stroud 2003, emphasis added TC). It came therefore as a surprise
to many when it became known that Essie Mae Washington-Williams was the breathing result of
social intercourse between her white segregationist father Thurmond and her African American
mother Carrie Butler. On December 15th, 2003, Thurmond’s family announced: “As J. Strom
Thurmond has passed away and cannot speak for himself, the Thurmond family acknowledges
Ms. Essie Mae Washington-Williams’ claim to her heritage. We hope this acknowledgment will
bring closure for Ms. Williams” (cited in Mattingly 2003).
Interestingly, on a personal level Thurmond appears to have acknowledged his African
American daughter at the same time he publicly uninvited Virgin Island Governor Hastie with the
following racist statement: “Governor Hastie knows that neither he nor any other Negro will ever
be a guest at the Governor’s house in Columbia so long as I am Governor” (Thurmond on Oct.
25, 1948 cited in Stroud 2003, emphasis added TC). At the same time he secretly received his
African American daughter Essie Mae Washington at the Governor’s Mansion (Stroud 2003).
Further, he expressed his personal-social ambivalence in 1998 stating: “I’ve always held kindly to
the black people … But it was just the custom and the law that they were separate, and if I held
otherwise, I would have been in violation of the law” (cited in Stroud 2003). That his first
acknowledged fatherhood had been in violation of the very anti-miscegenation laws that
Thurmond had so desperately fought to maintain flies in the face of any attempt to explain
political behavior rationally. It is, however, consistent with a neural model that allows different –
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even opposing – racial attitudes on the idiosyncratic and socially shared levels.
His initial attraction to Carrie Butler could be described as a result of idiosyncratic
‘chemistry’ resulting from the perception of internal body states and may well have been
non-conscious (implicit idiosyncratic attitude). In addition, however, Thurmond seems to have
consciously acknowledged his personal feelings (explicit idiosyncratic attitude) when he invited
his daughter to the Governor’s Mansion.

His use of the term “Negro” with a negative

connotation suggests the simultaneous non-conscious presence of negative, socially shared, racial
associations (implicit socially shared attitude) and his conscious and demonstrative un-invitation
of Virgin Island Governor Hastie suggests conscious endorsement of these negative attitudes
(explicit socially shared attitude).
For the purpose of empirical study, a number of measurement methods exist that may be
able to tap into the different types of attitudes distinguished here. Aron et al. (1991) developed a
trait-based reaction time task to measure non-conscious feelings of closeness among individual
partners in close relationships (implicit idiosyncratic attitudes).

This method has been

successfully applied to measure implicit feelings of closeness toward social groups (Coats et al.
2000, Smith & Henry 1996) and will be described in greater detail in section 3.1. Explicit
idiosyncratic attitudes are more difficult to measure in an empirical setting, especially if they
deviate from social norms. Due to their private nature, people may be reluctant to express them
to a stranger in a survey interview.

In the future, it may be possible to apply in-depth

interviewing by trusted friends to obtain measures of these feelings, but they are likely to remain
the most elusive to empirical study. In order to measure non-conscious aspects of socially shared
attitudes, racial priming measures are applied in this study (implicit socially shared attitudes).
These measures rely on association of word meaning (positive or negative), and are likely to be
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socially shared as an integral part of the communication process. The implicit racial priming
measure applied for this study will be described in greater detail in section 3.2. Finally, explicit
socially shared attitudes may be obtained by traditional survey measures. For the purpose of this
study, questions like “How close do you feel towards African Americans?” and “How close do
you feel towards White Americans?” were used, as were standard Feeling Thermometer ratings.
Survey responses allow participants sufficient time to consciously monitor their responses, and in
a politically sensitive area, such as race, it is likely that some respondents will adjust their
responses to conform to dominant social norms. In the following two sections, the two main
implicit measurement procedures that were obtained for this study will be explained: implicit
closeness towards African Americans and White Americans (section 3.1), and Implicit Racial
Priming (section 3.2).

3.1 Measuring Idiosyncratic Racial Attitudes Implicitly
Idiosyncratic measures of closeness towards African Americans and White Americans were
obtained utilizing a timed trait self-rating procedure developed by Arthur Aron and his
collaborators (1991).

This measure operationalizes the idea that feelings of closeness may

originate from an overlap of representations for the self and others in an individual’s mind. Their
reaction time based non-conscious measure was originally developed to measure feelings of
closeness between partners in individual relationships and has been successfully applied to the
group-level by Eliot R. Smith and Susan Henry (1996), as well as Susan Coats and her
collaborators (2000). In both studies, the timed trait rating procedure was used to measure
subjective closeness between the self and a non-political ingroup (a sorority or fraternity). Coats
et al. (2000) also investigated whether the implicit closeness measure would correlate with
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explicit paper-and-pencil measures of closeness. They found a strong correspondence between
conscious and non-conscious measures, a finding that does not seem surprising since the ingroups
and outgroups they used (sororities and fraternities) appear innocuous from a social desirability
point of view. Coats et al. (2000) write: “The advantages of implicit measures are obvious. They
are not subject to self presentational or social desirability concerns. In addition, because implicit
measures tap nonconscious, uncontrolled cognitive elements, they are less subject to demand
characteristics” (Coats et al. 2000, p. 313). This makes the application of this non-conscious
(implicit closeness) measure particularly attractive to the sensitive area of race and politics.
The timed trait self-rating task proceeds in two steps, an initial trait survey, and, after a
distracter task, the actual timed self-rating procedure (see figure 2). The first step is required for
classification purposes (for a detailed description see below) while the actual non-conscious
closeness measure is obtained in the second step. In the following paragraphs, both steps of the
procedure will be described in detail. Readers who are less interested in the technical details of
the measure may skip ahead to section 3.3 for a summary of the results.
In the first step of the procedure (see figure 2), each individual participant is asked to rate
each of 90 personality trait words3 as descriptive of the self, of “white Americans as a group,”
and of “African Americans as a group.” Responses are given on a seven-point scale ranging from
(1) “not at all” to (7) “extremely” descriptive with option (4) labeled as “neutral.” Based on these
ratings, each trait is classified as either matching between the individual and a given group, or as
mismatching. Note, although the meaning of the trait words themselves is likely to be socially
shared, the question whether any given trait is descriptive of the respondent is highly
idiosyncratic. Further, the self- and group ratings in this first step of the procedure are not used to

3

Thirty of the trait words have a negative connotation, thirty are neutral, and thirty positive, based on ratings
provided by Anderson 1968, see Aron et al. 1991.
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measure closeness, they serve strictly for classification purposes of ‘matching’ and ‘mismatching’
traits between the self and a group in the mind of the respondent. The actual measure of
closeness occurs in the second step of the procedure in the timed self-rating task that will be
described below.

Implicit Closeness Measure
Based on Aron et al. (1991)
•

Step (1) Trait Survey: Rating Self, African Americans, and Whites on 90 Traits:
“CONSIDERATE” Is this trait descriptive of (you as an individual /
African Americans as a group / white Americans as a group)?
1 = "Not at all"; 4="Moderately" 7 = "Extremely"

•

Step (2) Timed Trait Rating Task: (after a distracter task and a break) Rating Self Only:
Ask yourself this question:
'Does this trait describe ME as an individual?'
“CONSIDERATE”
Yes, No.

Figure 2: Schematic representation of implicit closeness measurement procedure

In order to classify matching and mismatching traits, questionnaire responses are dichotomized
with responses from (1) through (3) coded as ‘not descriptive’ and (5) through (7) as
‘descriptive’4. The top panel of table 1 gives an overview over the classification of matching (M)
and mismatching (M) traits based on the responses to the initial trait survey. The number of
matching traits (A+B in table 1) and mismatching ones (C+D) varies from one individual to the
next. Thus, if an individual rates a given trait as descriptive of the self and a given group, a
self-group match is recorded (Ta in the top panel of table 1). The same is true if the individual
rates a given trait as non-descriptive of the self and non-descriptive of the group (Tb in the top
panel of table 1).
4

Following Coats et al. (2000) neutral responses (4) are treated as missing information. No significant difference in
missing information occurred between racial groups in the sample (see section 3).
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Table 1: Computing Implicit Closeness Scores from Timed Trait-Self Rating Responses
Step 1: Trait Survey – Classifying Matching ( M ) and Mismatching ( M ) Traits ( T )
Trait

Descriptive of self?

Descriptive of Group?

Pattern

Trait

Ta of A Traits

Yes

Yes

Match

Mx

Trait

Tb of B Traits

No

No

Match

My

Trait

Tc of C Traits

Yes

No

Mismatch M x

Trait Td of D Traits

No

Yes

Mismatch M y

Trait Te of E Traits

Undecided

Undecided

Neutral (excluded)

Whereby A + B + C + D + E = 90 traits from Aron et al. (1991).
Step 2: Timed Trait Rating Task – Reaction time ( t ) to correctly recognize trait ( T )
Reaction Time Score t

“Does this trait describe me as an individual?”

Mean Reaction Time

A

tM x = ∑ ta

t a : reaction time to recognize* Ta as self-descriptive

B

t M y = ∑ tb
b =1

___

tM =

a =1

tM x + tM y
A+ B

t b : reaction time to recognize* Tb as non-self
descriptive

C

t M x = ∑ tc

tc : reaction time to recognize* Tc as self-descriptive

c =1
D

tM y = ∑ td

t d : reaction time to recognize* Td as non-self

___

tM =

tM x + tM y
C+D

descriptive
d =1
*) only reaction times of correctly recognized traits are used to compute implicit closeness scores,
totals A, B, C, and D are adjusted accordingly.
Step 3: Implicit Closeness Score towards either African Americans or White Americans
Implicit Closeness Score
___

iG towards group G :
___

iG = t M − t M
If the participant feels close to group
___

greater than that for matching traits ( t M

G , the average reaction time for mismatching traits should be
___

> t M ) and the implicit closeness score iG should be positive, else

it should be close to zero or negative if the participant feels neutral or distant .

If the individual rates a given trait as descriptive of the self but not of the group or
non-descriptive of the self but descriptive of the group a self-group mismatch is recorded (see
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entries for traits Tc and Td in the top panel of table 1). This procedure is applied to establish
match and mismatch patterns for both groups under investigation, African Americans and White
Americans.

Thus, each trait is classified as a self-Black match, a self-Black mismatch, a

self-White match, or a self-White mismatch.

The center panel in table 1 shows how the

distinction of matches (M) and mismatches (M) allows comparing average reaction times for
matching and mismatching trait words in the subsequent timed self-rating task.
The timed self-rating task is the most crucial component of the non-conscious closeness
measure. Each of the 90 trait words appears on the computer screen and the participant is asked
to indicate as quickly as possible whether each word is self-descriptive or not. The instructions
read: “Ask yourself this question: ‘Does this trait describe ME as an individual?’” followed by a
trait word, e.g., “CONSIDERATE” (see figure 2). The participant then presses a button labeled
as “Yes” or “No” as quickly as possible to record the response. What renders the timed trait
rating measure non-conscious is the fact that the timed trait description only refers to the self. No
reference is made to groups at this point. The psychological phenomenon that makes this
procedure viable as a non-conscious measure of closeness is the curious fact that distinct
facilitation and inhibition patterns occur for groups the individual feels close to while no such
patterns occur for groups the individual does not feel close to. If, in the mind of a respondent, the
self shares a trait with a close group, the trait is significantly faster identified as self-descriptive
(facilitation). If the self differs from a close group on a trait, the trait is significantly slower
identified as self-descriptive (inhibition). No such facilitation or inhibition effects occur for
groups that the individual does not feel close to.
To compute implicit closeness scores toward each group (see center and bottom panels in
table 1), reaction times (t) for all traits that are matching for the self and a given group are
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averaged (

tM

) and subtracted from the average reaction times for all traits that are mismatching

between the self and that group (

tM

). If the individual feels neutral towards the group (neither

close nor distant) there should be no observable reaction time difference between matching and
mismatching traits and the implicit closeness score should be close to zero. If the individual feels
close to the group, matching traits should be recognized as self-descriptive significantly faster
than mismatching traits and the implicit closeness score should be positive.

The implicit

closeness score should take on negative values if the individual feels distant to the group on the
non-conscious level.5
The characteristic facilitation and inhibition effects that occur for close others and groups
are interpreted by Aron et al. (1991) as indicating an overlap between the self-representation and
the representation of others in the mind of an individual, “an actual overlap or confusion of
cognitive structures” (Aron et al. 1991, p. 249). They write: “A possible explanation of the …
effect is that the cognitive structure of the self overlaps with the cognitive structure about the
other … Thus when a trait is descriptive of self but not other, there is a bit of confusion in
deciding whether it actually represents the self” (Aron et al. 1991 p. 248).

3.2 Measuring Socially Shared Racial Attitudes Implicitly
In order to measure socially shared implicit racial attitudes, an implicit priming procedure was
employed. The methodology of implicit priming was originally developed by James H. Neely
(1977) and adapted for the purpose of measuring racial attitudes by Greenwald et al. (1995), as
well as Fazio et al. (1995). The Implicit Association Test (IAT) developed by Greenwald et al.
(1995) and Fazio’s et al. (1995) racial priming method differ in a number of respects, but they
5

In order to reduce the inevitable skewness of reaction time measures, response times shorter than 300ms or longer
than 2000ms are excluded from this computation (Coats et al. 2000, pp. 308-309).
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share the idea that the positive or negative meaning of a prime word that flashes up on the
participant’s computer screen is associated with the meaning of an otherwise unrelated target
word. The participant is asked to indicate as quickly as possible whether the target word has a
positive or negative meaning by pressing a button. Table 2 lists the prime and target words used
for this study. In order to exclude conscious control on the part of the participant, prime words
were displayed for a mere 20ms, too fast for conscious recognition. Thus, for participants, only
the target words were consciously visible on the computer screen, appearing after a brief flash.
The target words were selected from M.M. Bradley and P.J. Lang’s (1999) List of Affective
Norms for English Words (ANEW) and are listed in table 2 along with their mean valence
ratings6.

Table 2: Racial Priming: Prime and Target Words
Target Words
Mean Valence
Love
8.72
Joy
8.60
Friendly
8.43
“Black”
Win
8.38
Success
8.29
“African American”
Funeral
1.39
Cancer
1.50
“White”
Rejected
1.50
Sad
1.61
“White American”
Death
1.61
Target words and mean Valence ratings for target words from
Bradley & Lang 1999

Prime Words:

St. Dev.
0.70
0.71
1.08
0.92
0.93
0.87
0.85
1.09
0.95
1.40

In order to reduce the inevitable skewness associated with raw reaction time measures, all
responses shorter than 250ms and exceeding 2500ms were eliminated (truncation). The truncated
raw reaction time measures were log-transformed to further reduce skewness. The transformed
reaction time measures were then converted to facilitation scores by subtracting the reaction times
6

Five positive and five negative words were chosen from this list of 1036 normed words. Race un-related words
were chosen with a frequency of at least F=25 and valence ratings greater than 8 for positive words and less than 2
for negative ones.
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associated with racial prime-target pairs from neutral prime-target pairs. This was done for black
and white prime words, as well as negative and positive target words separately. The neutral
prime consisted of a white background with the character string “#########” displayed at the
center of the computer screen. The facilitation score obtained in this way can be interpreted as the

relative acceleration of responses following racial primes compared to neutral ones.
If t stands for the reaction time in milliseconds following a neutral prime and f stands for
the facilitation score, then t / e f gives the reaction time in milliseconds following a racial prime.
For example, if a neural prime takes about 600ms and the facilitation score is .0168, the reaction
time for the racial prime can be obtained by computing (600)/(e.0168) = 590. This represents a
10ms increase in reaction speed following the racial prime compared to the neutral one. The
advantage of these relative facilitation scores over Fazio et al.’s (1995) raw facilitation scores is
the fact that they eliminate individual differences in overall reaction time by looking at the
relative value. (Non-truncated and non-log transformed raw facilitation scores show similar
patterns at slightly lower levels of statistical significance).

3.3 Results Based on 555 College Students
A sample of N=555 undergraduate students participated in this study for credit at the Department
of Political Science at Stony Brook University during the fall semester of 2003 and during the
spring term of 2004. The demographic profile of the sample is not representative of the United
States but it closely reflects the racial and ethnic composition of the undergraduate student body
at Stony Brook. Fifteen percent of the sample consisted of international students (non-U.S.
Citizens of any race) while 85 percent consisted of U.S. Citizens. Of these, 47 percent
self-identified as White non-Hispanic, 10 percent as Black non-Hispanic, 11 percent as Hispanic
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of any race, 24 percent Asian non-Hispanic, and 8 percent chose the residual ‘other’ category.
Each participant filled in a self-administered computer questionnaire in the Behavioral
Labs of Stony Brook University’s Political Science Department. The computer questionnaire was
programmed using Inquisit, a software package that allows precise reaction time measurements
by controlling the computer’s task-prioritizing functions. This prevents programs running in the
background from distorting reaction time measures. The study consisted of a political survey
including questions about feelings towards social groups (closeness questions and feeling
thermometer ratings) and a number of standard survey items on policy issues and demographic
questions (including ideology, party ID, ethnicity and race). The study contained the two sets of
implicit reaction time measures described in sections 3.1 and 3.2. A racial policy score was
computed from four standard racial policy items (see table 7 in the appendix). This summary
score was coded so that greater numbers represent more liberal views and smaller numbers more
conservative views on issues such as affirmative action and government aid to African
Americans.
To investigate the construct validity of the implicit and explicit racial attitude measures,
they are entered as predictors into a maximum likelihood model of Pro-Black Policy Support in
table 3. The variable ‘Motivation to Control Prejudice’ represents a control for social desirability
consisting of a three item scale by Fazio et al. (1995). This scale contains questions that gauge
how important it is to an individual to appear unprejudiced. The last column lists the impact of
each independent variable, from the smallest observed value to the largest and allows for
comparison among predictor variables. The explicit survey question “How close do you feel
towards African Americans / White Americans” (Explicit Black / White Closeness in table 3)
emerges as the most powerful predictor of racial policy preferences, whereby explicit closeness
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towards African Americans predicts more liberal and explicit closeness towards whites more
conservative opinions (both reaching or approaching significance at p=.01). Even after
controlling for explicit closeness, implicit feelings closeness towards African Americans predict
liberal opinions on race related policies at the p<.01 level of significance. While this idiosyncratic
implicit measure exerts a powerful and significant effect of roughly the same magnitude as the
standard 7-point ideology scale, the effect of the socially shared implicit racial priming measures
are statistically indistinguishable from zero.

Table 3: Racial Policy Liberalism by Implicit and Explicit Attitudes
Racial Policy Liberalism1
Coef.
s.e.
p(z)
Impact*
Implicit Black Closeness
0.004
0.002
0.009
2.489
Implicit White Closeness
-0.002
0.002
0.220
-1.139
Implicit Black Priming
0.397
1.560
0.799
0.647
Implicit White Priming
-0.320
1.704
0.851
-0.401
Explicit Black Closeness
1.105
0.164
0.000
3.315
Explicit White Closeness
-0.441
0.180
0.014
-1.323
Conservative Ideology
-0.413
0.110
0.000
-2.478
Republican PID
-0.757
0.358
0.034
-0.757
Prejudice Monitoring
0.098
0.031
0.002
1.760
White non-Hispanic
-0.610
0.515
0.236
-0.610
Black non-Hispanic
0.339
0.646
0.599
0.339
Hispanic (any race)
0.668
0.607
0.271
0.668
Asian non-Hispanic
0.512
0.543
0.346
0.512
Constant
10.779
1.017
0.000
Log Likelihood
-608.613
Wald χ2 (13df)
209.870
Prob > χ2
0.000
N
416
1
) Racial Policy Liberalism: 4-item summary scale, wording see table 7 in the appendix.
Estimation Method: Maximum Likelihood; Significant coefficients shaded to facilitate
interpretation. *) Impact: impact of each independent variable going from the smallest
observed value to the largest one.

Republican partisanship is predictive of racially conservative opinions (p<.05) and the
‘Motivation to Control Prejudice’ is predictive of racially liberal opinions (p<.01). The latter
coefficient suggests that participants who state that it is important to them to appear unprejudiced
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may over-exaggerate their support for race targeted policies such as affirmative action.
Interestingly, once implicit and explicit feelings of closeness toward racial groups are controlled
for, racial and ethnic group membership ceases to exert any significant influence. The fact that
implicit idiosyncratic feelings of closeness towards African Americans appear to be large and
significant predictors of racial policy liberalism supports the construct validity of this implicit
idiosyncratic measure. The fact, however, that racial priming measures appear to be unrelated to
racial policy liberalism at first blush casts doubt on their validity as a measures of implicit
socially shared racial attitudes. At closer inspection, however, their lack of predictive power and
their lack of correlation with explicit measures of socially shared racial attitudes may not be so
surprising. This lack of correlation is consistent with a large body of literature on the Implicit
Association test, and it follows from the prediction of the Racial Norms Evolution Model
presented in section 2. Thoroughly rehearsed socially shared attitudes should be universally
shared due to the process of ‘random drift’ described by Kimura (1983, see section 2.3). As a
universally shared attitude, it should take on a near constant value resulting in zero-correlations.
This lack of correlation between implicit priming measures has been described in the
literature on the Implicit Association Test (IAT, Greenwald et al. 1995). Greenwald et al. (2002)
review a large volume of IAT evidence and find that dissociations between implicit and explicit
attitudes using this measure have been confirmed in the area of race and ethnicity and have also
been identified in the area of gender and age (Greenwald et al. 2002, p. 18). While social
desirability concerns may provide a plausible explanation for dissociation in this socially
sensitive domain, the same explanation does not seem plausible as an explanation of low
correlations in the area of flowers, musical instruments, insects, and weapons that formed the
initial basis for the IAT measure in Greenwald et al. (1995). The lack of correlation in the latter
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domain would seem to be much more consistent with an interpretation of implicit
word-association measures (IAT and Racial Priming) as tapping socially shared aspects of word
meaning.

Further support can be gleaned from implicit attitudes of the racial IAT from

non-White participants. A number of studies suggest that non-White participants, especially
African Americans, display as much pro-White and anti-Black bias in their implicit word
associations as their White American counterparts. Using the standard computerized version of
the IAT, for example, Dasgupta et al. (2000) find pro-White and anti-Black reaction time patterns
despite the fact that more than half (53 percent) of their sample is composed of non-White
respondents. Jost et al. (2004) reviews findings from the internet version of the IAT and finds
that “members of low-status minority groups (including African Americans) commonly fail to
exhibit ingroup bias and show preferences for higher-status outgroups – even when these
preferences are soundly rejected at an explicit, conscious level” (Jost et al., 2004, p. 893). Nosek
et al. (2002) describe this contrast: “strong explicit liking reported by Black respondents for their
own group stands in sharp contrast to performance on the implicit measure” (Nosek et al. 2002, p.
105). Ashburn-Nardo et al. (2003) obtained IAT measures of N=80 African Americans and
found “the IAT effect was significantly different from zero and in a negative direction …
underscoring the degree to which many black participants in our sample exhibited relatively
negative ingroup associations” (Ashburn-Nardo et al. 2003, p.73) and conclude: “Indeed,
mounting evidence suggests that many … black individuals do hold outgroup-favoring
associations at the implicit level” (Ashburn-Nardo et al. 2003, p. 80).
In order to compare the results of this study to the studies cited above, all racial attitude
variables obtained in this study were converted into scores ranging from a pro-White extreme to a
pro-Black one with zero representing the neutral midpoint (where attitudes towards African
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Americans and Whites are equal). To make the measures comparable, they were converted to
z-scores and midpoint was preserved by adding the z-score for the neutral zero point to each
original z-score. This z-score with neutral midpoint is denoted as z’ = z+(0-mean)/st.dev. Figure
3 displays the z’-scores for the three racial attitude measures under consideration in this study.
Bars flagged with two stars represent z’-scores that are significantly different from the neutral
zero-point, whereby positive numbers represent comparatively more pro-Black attitudes and
negative numbers comparatively more pro-White ones.

The results suggest that implicit

idiosyncratic attitudes (implicit closeness represented by black bars), despite their powerful
predictiveness of racial policy preferences, do not significantly deviate from zero in any racial
group under consideration. This is consistent with the idea of an idiosyncratic measure that
should display variance between individuals, not between groups.
College Student Data (N=555)

Pro-Black
1.50

**

0.00

**

**

**

**

** **
**

**
-1.50
Pro-White Non-U.S.

White

Black

Implicit Closeness

Hispanic

Explicit Closeness

Asian

Other

Racial Priming

Figure 3: College Student Data by Racial Groups

In contrast, explicit socially shared attitudes measured by explicit closeness questions (grey bars)
display systematic and large differences between groups. White and Asian American participants
express significantly more pro-White than pro-Black attitudes, while African Americans express
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overwhelmingly pro-Black attitudes (all deviations from the neutral zero-point are significant at

p<.01). When the results of implicit socially shared measures are considered (Racial Priming
represented by white bars), no group differences are visible, instead all groups display a highly
significant (p<.01) pro-White and anti-Black bias. This is consistent with the findings from the
IAT literature cited above and supports the that reaction time procedures based on
word-associations may tap universally shared, not necessarily individually endorsed, aspects of
racial attitudes. In their inaugural presentation of the IAT methodology, Greenwald et al. (1995)
support this interpretation by demonstrating that “IAT measures were highly sensitive to
evaluative discriminations that are well established in the connotative meaning structure of the
English language” (Greenwald et al. 1995, p. 1469). The contrast that emerges, especially for
African American participants, between their explicit socially shared attitudes (grey bar in figure
3) and their automatic word-associations (white bar) can be illustrated with a historical example:
In his Address at the Conclusion of the Selma to Montgomery March on March 25th, 1965 Martin
Luther King counter-intentionally invoked ingrained linguistic and racial associations while
explicitly criticizing such stereotypes: “How long will prejudice blind the visions of men, darken
their understanding, and drive bright-eyed wisdom from her sacred throne?” (King in Carson &
Shepard 2001, p. 130, emphasis added TC). The explicit attitudes expressed give voice to the
views of the Civil Rights Movement, while the figures of speech invoked implicitly represent
ingrained elements of the overall linguistic culture.
The significance tests in table 4 give the differences in group means for the measures in
figure 3 (ANOVA F-Test for Racial Group Differences) and the overall deviation from the
neutral zero-point within the entire sample (t-Test for Deviation of Grand Mean from Scale
Midpoint). As would be expected for an implicit idiosyncratic measure (Implicit Closeness), no

26

group differences emerge (see left hand panel in table 4) and no systematic racial bias can be
detected (see right hand panel of table 4). In contrast, for the explicit measure of socially shared
attitudes (Explicit Closeness), significant group differences emerge (left hand panel), and the
sample mean is significantly and systematically biased in a pro-White and anti-Black direction
(see negative t-test value in the right hand panel). Finally, for implicit socially shared attitudes
(Racial Priming), no group differences can be distinguished (left hand panel), but a significant
and systematic pro-White and anti-Black bias can be observed (see negative t-test value in the
right hand panel of table 4). This is consistent with the universal IAT-effect observed in the IATliterature (Greenwald et al. 1995, Greenwald et al. 2002, Dasgupta et al. 2000, Jost et al. 2004,
Nosek et al. 2002, Ashburn-Nardo et al. 2003). In order to investigate the theoretical consistency
of these empirical findings with the Model of Racial Norms Evolution presented in section 2, a
computational version of the model is presented in the following section and simulated results are
compared to the patterns observed in figure 3 and table 4.

Table 4: Group Norms (F-Tests) and Universal Norms (t-Tests) in Student Data (N=555)
ANOVA F-Test for
Racial Group Differences
Implicit Closeness
Explicit Closeness
Racial Priming

ANOVA F
0.876
29.450
.990

t-Test for Deviation of
Grand Mean from Scale Midpoint

p(F)
0.497
0.000
0.423

t
0.821
-4.468
-3.915

p(t)
0.413
0.000
0.000

4. A Computational Model of Racial Norms Evolution
The computational model of Racial Norms Evolution simulates a population of the same size as
the sample of college students in section 3 (N=555). Individuals are arranged on a
two-dimensional grid of 15 x 37 cells. The racial composition of the simulated population
reflects that of the college student sample in section 3 and group members are clustered to mimic
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racially segregated living arrangements frequently encountered in the contemporary United
States. Each individual is assumed to have two racial attitudes, one idiosyncratic, and one socially
shared. Atttitudes are represented by random numbers between zero and one, whereby zero
represents extremely pro-White and one extremely pro-Black attitudes. The midpoint of the scale
represents neutrality where attitudes towards Whites and Blacks are equal. At the beginning of
the simulation process attitudes are randomly initialized from a uniform distribution between zero
and one, and idiosyncratic as well as socially shared attitudes are identical. Throughout the
simulation process, idiosyncratic attitudes are kept constant, while socially shared attitudes are
subject to change through random persuasion. In each simulation round t, one individual is
selected at random to be the ‘persuader’ It and one of the direct neighbors in the grid is randomly
selected as the ‘persuadee’ Jt . The persuadee takes on the socially shared attitude of the
persuader, so that Jt = It. There is a probability of taking on one’s own idiosyncratic attitude as
socially shared attitude instead of the persuader’s attitude and this probability is denoted by

p(idiosyncratic). This probability is set at different values during five simulations ranging from
p(idiosyncratic)=0.00,

0.25,

0.50,

0.75,

to

p(idiosyncratic)=1.00.

At

one

extreme,

at

p(idiosyncratic)=0.00, individuals never express their idiosyncratic racial attitudes and are
maximally susceptible to persuasion by others. At the other extreme where p(idiosyncratic)=1.00
they express only their idiosyncratic attitudes and are entirely immune to persuasion by others.
The implicit-explicit dimension is represented by time (the number of persuasion rounds).
Applying the Hebbian interpretation of attitude rehearsal, attitudes that have been rehearsed for
longer periods of time should become automatic (implicit). Thus, simulated attitudes after 50,000
persuasion rounds might represent explicit socially shared attitudes, while simulated attitudes
after 300,000 rounds might represent implicit socially shared norms.
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Table 5: Five Simulations of Racial Norms Evolution with Different Settings of p(idiosyncratic)*
Round 1:
Round 50,000
Round 300,000
Simulation 1: p(idiosyncratic) = 0.00

Simulation 2: p(idiosyncratic) = 0.25

Simulation 3: p(idiosyncratic) = 0.50

Simulation 4: p(idiosyncratic) = 0.75

Simulation 5: p(idiosyncratic) = 1.00

*) p(idiosyncratic) represents the probability of an individual’s idiosyncratic attitude being expressed.
Each square in this 15 x 37 matrix represents a single individual (N=555); the number of individuals in clusters
represent the number of individuals of the indicated racial or ethnic category in the college student experiment
described in section 3. Attitudes are color coded from most pro-African American (red in color or light gray in gray
scale representation) to most pro-White American (black in both color and gray scale).

Table 5 presents the results of the five simulations described above. Each square in the matrices
represents the socially shared racial attitude, one individual color coded to represent the most
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pro-African American attitudes as bright red, and the most pro-White American attitudes as
black. For each simulation, the initial distribution at round 1 is displayed on the left, the results
after 50,000 persuasion rounds in the middle, and after 300,000 persuasion rounds on the right.
Idiosyncratic attitudes are omitted from table 5 since they are equal to the initial distributions on
the left hand side and remain constant throughout the simulation process. This does not imply that
idiosyncratic attitudes are viewed as immutable in reality, they are simply held constant for
purposes of simulation in order to investigate the dynamics of persuasion on the socially shared
level. In all simulations in table 5 in which p(idiosyncratic) is less than 1.00, clustering of socially
shared attitudes is evident. That is, as long as social communication is permitted to have any
influence at all, norms of varying strength emerge. This process is most pronounced in
simulations 1 and 2 where the influence of idiosyncratic attitudes is relatively low (simulations 1
and 2 with p(idiosyncratic)=.00 and p(idiosyncratic)=.25 respectively). While a relatively pro-White
and anti-Black norm emerges as dominant in simulation 1 (dark red or grey coloring), a relatively
pro-Black and anti-White one emerges in simulation 2 (bright red or grey coloring). This process
of random norms evolution emerges according to the dynamics of Kimura’s (1983) Neutral
Theory of Evolution and is only absent in simulation 5 in which the social influences are
precluded by virtue of setting p(idiosyncratic) to 1.00. In simulations 3 and 4, with

p(idiosyncratic)≥.50, the norms formation is less pronounced and statistical analysis is required to
detect the degree to which social norms emerge.
Figure 4 presents bar-graphs similar to the bar graphs for the college student sample in
figure 3. For each of the racial groups, the bars represent mean deviations from the neutral
midpoint of the simulated racial attitude scale, deviations in a positive direction representing
more pro-Black attitudes (brighter red or gray in table 5) and deviations in a negative direction
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representing more pro-White attitudes (darker red or gray in table 5). The top panel in figure 4
represents simulation 1 for which the p(idiosyncratic) was set at zero. Invariably, under this setting
a single attitude survives and the simulation comes to an end once no further changes are
possible. The bar chart shows initial (idiosyncratic) attitudes (black bars) not differing
significantly from the neutral midpoint of the racial attitude scale. After 50,000 persuasion rounds
(see grey bars) significant group differences have emerged, with some groups taking on norms
that deviate from the neutral midpoint in a positive direction, and others in a negative direction.
After 300,000 persuasion rounds, all groups have adopted a universally pro-White and anti-Black
norm. The graph on the right hand side of the top panel in figure 4 plots the mean (bold black
line) and the standard deviation (thin black line) of racial attitudes for the entire duration of
simulation 1. It illustrates how the mean starts off at the neutral midpoint initially, veers off the
neutral midpoint for a while, until it reaches an equilibrium state far off the neutral midpoint. As
the norm crystallizes, the standard deviation gradually decreases over the first third of the
evolution (about 300,000 rounds), and remains just above zero for the remainder of the
simulation until the last individual adopts the social norm in round 950,000 and the standard
deviation goes to zero. This is the process of random drift described in Kimura’s (1983) Neutral
Theory of Evolution. The only prediction that can be made with certainty in this random model
is the fact that a norm will evolve – the direction of the norm is entirely unpredictable, as is the
question how far away from the neutral midpoint it will fall. The process becomes indefinite
once idiosyncratic attitudes supply a constant supply of new minority attitudes. A large number
of simulations were run apart from the simulations displayed in table 5 to ensure that the results
are not simply peculiar patterns, but predictably reoccurring patterns. When the bar graphs for the
four simulations are compared for which p(idiosyncratic)<1.00, the results are surprisingly similar.
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Simulation 1
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Hispanic

Round 50K

Asian

Non-U.S.

Other

White

Black

Round 1

Round 300K

Hispanic

Round 50K

Asian

Other

Round 300K

Simulations of Racial Attitudes in Round 1 (Implicit Idiosyncratic),
Round 50,000 (Explicit Socially Shared) and
Round 300,000 (Implicit Socially Shared)

In each case, initial idiosyncratic attitudes (black bars) are, on average, close to the neutral
midpoint without significant group differences, after 50,000 persuasion rounds (grey bars),
socially shared attitudes display significant group differences and bars point in different
directions. Finally, after 300,000 persuasion rounds, white bars generally point in the same
direction (universal norm) and are significantly different from the neutral midpoint for most
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groups. The only exception is simulation 5 for which p(idiosyncratic)=1.00 and social influences
are ruled out by definition. In this case the initial idiosyncratic distribution remains constant, no
group differences occur, and no universal norm emerges that is significantly different from the
neutral midpoint.

Table 6: Group Norms (F-Tests) and Universal Norms (t-Tests) in Simulation Data
ANOVA F-Test for
Racial Group Differences

Simulation 1
Round 1
Round 50,000
Round 300,000
Simulation 2
Round 1
Round 50,000
Round 300,000
Simulation 3
Round 1
Round 50,000
Round 300,000
Simulation 4
Round 1
Round 50,000
Round 300,000
Simulation 5
Round 1
Round 50,000
Round 300,000

ANOVA F
1.124
21.081
29.773
ANOVA F
1.998
17.761
153.641
ANOVA F
0.697
15.565
19.867
ANOVA F
0.398
9.508
7.232
ANOVA F
0.496
0.496
0.496

t-Test for Deviation of
Grand Mean from Scale Midpoint

p(F)
0.346
0.000
0.000
p(F)
0.077
0.000
0.000
p(F)
0.626
0.000
0.000
p(F)
0.850
0.000
0.000
p(F)
0.779
0.779
0.779

t
-0.393
3.780
-1174.014
t
-0.734
3.688
38.176
t
0.056
-5.421
-23.514
t
1.440
1.231
7.808
t
1.001
1.001
1.001

p(t)
0.695
0.000
0.000
p(t)
0.464
0.000
0.000
p(t)
0.956
0.000
0.000
p(t)
0.151
0.219
0.000
p(t)
0.317
0.317
0.317

Table 6 presents statistics that corroborate this interpretation. Looking at the ANOVA-F tests on
the left hand side, the results for simulations 1 through 4 show no significant group differences in
initial round 1. After 50,000 rounds, significant group differences emerge and remain throughout
round 300,000. The right hand side of table provides t-tests for the emergence of a universal
norm. The patterns for simulations 1 through 4 mirror those of the student data in table 4 in many
important respects – no significant universal norm exists in round 1 (idiosyncratic attitudes),
while significant deviations from the neutral midpoint emerge after social communication has
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taken place (explicit and implicit socially shared attitudes). The only simulation in which no
norm evolves is simulation 5, for which social communication has been excluded by definition
(p(idiosyncratic)=1.00). This simulation experiment suggests that the random Norms Evolution
process is a robust phenomenon that emerges as long as any persuasion is possible at all.
Although the simulated process has been a highly simplified and parsimonious version of a real
world process, the complex patterns that emerge display some surprising similarities to observed
data.

5. Conclusions
The theoretical model of Racial Norms Evolution presented here combines two assumptions of
neural organization with one assumption about social communication processes. The first of these
assumptions holds that perceptions of internal body states (‘chemistry’ or idiosyncratic attitudes),
and perceptions of external stimuli (socially shared attitudes) are processed in different (yet
interconnected) areas of the brain. The second assumption holds that attitudes rehearsed for a
longer period of time become automatic by a process of Hebbian learning (Hebb 1949, see also
Wilson et al. 2000). This leads to a two-by-two classification of attitudes, (1) implicit
idiosyncratic, (2) explicit idiosyncratic, (3) implicit socially shared, and (4) explicit socially
shared, three of which were considered in this study (1, 3, and 4). The third assumption of the
model holds that social communication can produce social norms by virtue of a process that has
been described by Kimura (1983) as ‘random drift’. The tendency for computational models of
social communication processes to produce unanimity as a function of random rather than
systematic processes has been noted with puzzlement by some social scientists. Andrzej Nowak
et al. (1990), for example, criticize: “the implicit null hypothesis seemingly held by most social
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psychologists is that group processes, if allowed to work themselves through to their conclusion,
would lead to a final distribution of opinion … with zero variance” (Nowak et al. 1990, p. 363).
Due to the fact that public opinion research generally focuses on divisive issues rather than
unanimous ones, this general tendency of random norms evolution has been dismissed by
political scientists as an anomaly and several computational modelers have sought to limit this
tendency by including restrictive elements in their models. Nowak et al. (1990), for example,
propose a computer model in which stable local ‘pockets’ of dissent remain due to the fact that
some members of the society have zero persuasiveness.

Similarly, Robert Axelrod (1997)

proposes a model for the dissemination of culture in which communication is a function of
‘similarity’ between two individuals and stable pockets of dissent remain if similarity between
some individuals is set to zero: “If they are completely different, they will not even interact”
(Axelrod 1997, p. 211). In practice, however, it is hard to imagine what ‘zero similarity’ between
two people could mean, since they will at least share their common humanity. Similarly, it is hard
to imagine what ‘zero persuasiveness’ means as long as a human being is able to communicate at
all. Despite these rather strong and restrictive assumptions these models do not produce stable
opinion splits close to the 50 percent mark typical for the ones identified in many public opinion
surveys, but produce rather small pockets of dissenting views and sometimes none at all. This
paper takes a different approach and allows for the possibility that this general tendency of
random norms evolution may have a parallel in real world communication processes. It may help
us explain the otherwise puzzling observation that people adjust their views to powerful social
norms (e.g., Devine 1989, Terkildsen 1993, Fazio et al. 1995, Greenwald et al. 1995, Kuklinski et
al. 1997, Berinsky 2004, Feldman & Huddy 2005). If we assume that social norms are simply an
additive function of individual attitudes, no systematic differences should occur between average
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idiosyncratic and average socially shared attitudes.
According to the college student experiment described in section 3, no systematic racial
bias is observable at the level of implicit idiosyncratic measures (Implicit Closeness), while a
significant anti-Black bias is observable at the level of both explicit and implicit socially shared
attitudes (Explicit Closeness, and Racial Priming respectively). The simulation results presented
in section 4 faithfully replicate these patterns as long as social communication is possible at all,
i.e., as long as p(idiosyncratic)<1.00. The model is maximally parsimonious, holding idiosyncratic
attitudes constant, and allowing changes in socially shared attitudes due to random persuasion
among neighbors. More sophisticated versions of the computational model could allow for
random change in idiosyncratic attitudes, and it could allow for individual differences in

p(idiosyncratic). While these changes might lead to more realistic results, it is noteworthy that a
maximally parsimonious baseline model suffices to produce considerable similarity between
observed and simulated racial attitude data. Due to its parsimony, the Model of Racial Norms
Evolution presented here may serve as a null model against which more complex models can be
tested.
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Appendix:

Table 7: Components of the Racial Policy (RP) Dependent Variable
Because of past discrimination, minorities should be given special consideration when decisions
are made about hiring applicants for jobs - do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat
disagree, or strongly disagree?
The government in Washington should make every possible effort to improve the socioeconomic
RP 2: position of Blacks and minority groups - do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat
disagree, or strongly disagree?
Where would you place the government in Washington's efforts to improve the social and
RP 3: economic position of Blacks and other minority groups on a scale ... where 1= the government
should not make any special effort, and 7 = the government should make every possible effort?
The government should not make any special effort to help Blacks and other minorities because
RP 4: they should help themselves - do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or
strongly disagree?
The responses are summed up and recoded so that greater numbers represent greater racial policy liberalism
and smaller numbers greater racial policy conservatism.
Source for question wording: NES, NBES, see Tate (1993)
RP 1:
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